TL;DR: You still haven't answered the only relevant question: if a locative before a comparative always applies to the entire construction, what's the grammar which allows {reH latlh qabDaq qul tuj law' Hoch tuj puS} to mean "the fire is always hotter on someone else's face"? On Sat, 13 Feb 2021 at 17:35, Will Martin <willmartin2@mac.com> wrote:
[...] Okrand remained true to his explanation in TKD that there is no alternative grammatical structure for comparing two things in Klingon. It’s always [X Q law’ Y Q puS] where X and Y are nouns and Q is a verb of quality (like {tIn} or {chuS}).
Can you quote from the passage in TKD where it says this description of the comparative is exhaustive? Okrand never interrupts <[Context providing head stuff] X Q law’ Y Q puS>
to form what one might logically wish to conclude would be allowed: *<[Context providing head stuff] X Q law’ [Different context providing head stuff] Y Q puS>*.
Never? Do you mean except for {Qam[taH]vIS Hegh qaq law' tor[taH]vIS yIn qaq puS}, the very sentence that started this discussion?
Assuming that you can’t have separate scope [...]
While the logical view of the comparative sees two halves [...]
You keep writing "logic" this and "assuming" that. But can you acknowledge that there is an *actual counterexample* that contradicts your claim? You'd previously written that the sentences suggested by mayqel qunen'oS, based on the grammar of the {Qam[taH]vIS...} sentence, seem fine to you. Is this grammatical structure an exception to your insistence that the comparative doesn't have two halves? Did you change your mind?
[...] There is no reason to assume that the head stuff would apply to one instance and not the other.
But it's not an *assumption*. The way that evidence works is that if you produce a dozen, or a thousand, or even a million examples which doesn't show X, it doesn't prove that X is never true. But if there is just *one* example of X, then that's sufficient reason to conclude that X is sometimes true. You keep asserting that there is "no reason" and "no evidence" that the two halves of a comparative can have different contexts. But we already know of one canon example ({Qam[taH]vIS...}). TKW says that grammar is "a bit aberrant; one would expect {QamtaHvIS}... and {tortaHvIS}". In other words, it's allowed to put a subordinate clause in front of each half of a comparative (at least in some situations). If this isn't actual evidence that the comparative construction has two halves, then what is it? You also keep repeating that every canon instance of comparatives and superlatives (except the specific ones under discussion) shows that the same context applies to both sides of the comparison. Leaving aside that this isn't true for {Qam[taH]vIS...}, doesn't this actually *support* my observation that your explanation of the grammar of the comparative is internally inconsistent? You've previously explained that you think the meaning of the proverb is that there is "ONE fire, and the place where it is hottest is at someone else’s face" (meaning that it is hotter than the same fire on my face or our face or whatever). If {latlh qabDaq} restricts the entire comparative, then what's the grammar that produces this meaning? If all canon examples of comparatives and superlatives (excepting {Qam[taH]vIS...}) apply the same context to the entire construction, how is this proverb comparing the one fire on someone else's face to anything not on that face? Until you answer that question, this sentence appears to be a counterexample to your claims. A million examples doesn't prove a rule, but a single counterexample disproves it. Every time you repeat that all (other) canon comparatives and superlatives apply the same context to the entire construction, you're just highlighting how different {reH latlh qabDaq...} is from all of them. So one of two things has to be true: (1) it's a counterexample to your claims about comparatives; (2) it means something different than what you think it means. -- De'vID